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Abstract 
This contribution raises the question about where things have gone wrong in 
evolutionary history. In classic Christian discourse it is typically assumed that the 
primary problem is human sin, while the problem of natural evil is emphasised 
elsewhere. It seeks to test the distinction between natural suffering and socially-
induced forms of suffering by exploring the roots of violence between species with 
reference to the emergence of the act of eating in evolutionary history. It draws on a 
corpus of recent literature on the consumption of food, with specific reference to the 
work of Edward Farley, Sallie McFague and Norman Wirzba, in order to address 
the following question: Is the violence associated with what Christians would 
redescribe as sin merely an extrapolation of the ‘violence’ embedded in the act of 
eating? The conclusion from this survey seems to be that an Augustinian approach 
is indeed less plausible and more counter-intuitive than Manichean or Pelagian 
assessments of where things have gone wrong in evolutionary history. If so, this 
would have far-reaching consequences for moral formation. The conclusion is 
offered here in the hope that it would be refuted by others! 
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Where have Things gone wrong in Evolutionary History? 
Where have things gone wrong in the evolution of life on earth? Is there a sense in which 
nature too has to be redeemed (irrespective of human impact), for example with reference 
to the brutality that characterises relationships between non-human animals? Would a 
Christian emphasis on human sin as the root of evil not underestimate the problem of 
natural suffering, even where it is allowed that human pride, greed, subjugation, alienation 
and moral failure have greatly exacerbated such suffering? What exactly is the problem 
from which the world has to be saved? Consider the following possibilities as to where 
things may have gone wrong:
2
  
 Contingency and chance in a world in flux that is not characterised by some eternal 
essence. Does God play dice? Is salvation then the eradication of contingency? 
 Entropy and the arrow of time implying the transience of everything in the universe 
                                                 
1  This article is based on a paper delivered at a conference on “Re-imagining the Intersection of Evolution and 
the Fall”, Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary (Evanston, IL), 26-28 March 2015. 
2  More or less the same list may also be found in my Saving the Earth? (Conradie 2013b:19-20), in a section 
that explains the difficulty of doing justice to both God’s work of creation and of salvation. See also an essay 
on “Darwin’s ambiguous gift to reformed theology” (Conradie 2013a:100-101).  
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(including stars, planets, continents, mountains and rivers). The cosmological 
transience of the earth itself – which is destined to melt away when the sun becomes 
a supernova in about 5 billion years’ time. Is salvation then ‘eternal’ salvation from 
temporality? 
 The very basis of biological functioning in terms of living organisms absorbing 
inorganic materials. Eating organic leftovers (like fruit and nuts). Eating living 
organic material (grass, vegetables). Eating other living organisms (meat). Does 
‘eternal’ life still imply eating and the violence embedded in such eating? Is eternal 
life then still a form of life? 
 The pre-programmed, limited life cycle of multi-cellular organisms and their cells 
(planned obsolescence). Aging, vulnerability, fragility, degeneration and the decay 
of possibilities. The eventual mortality of every form of life but also of species. Is 
death God’s own doing? Is salvation then to be understood as biological perfection 
or longevity?  
 The contingency, dead-ends, chaotic and experimental nature and incredible 
wastefulness of evolutionary drivers. Does God support the survival of the fittest? 
 Pain impulses. Sentient suffering. Anxieties over the possibility of future suffering 
among the ‘higher’ mammals. Is the very notion of God perhaps born from (human) 
anxiety over finitude (in the form of vulnerability together with limited power and 
knowledge)? Are we to be saved from such anxiety? Would it help if all tears were 
wiped from our eyes? 
 Killing for food. Excessive violence, brutality and ‘torture’, also among non-human 
species. Are ‘selfish genes’ inscribed in God’s good creation? May mammals ter-
minate other forms of life (also vegetables) to obtain food for themselves as long as 
this is done without brutality? Are we only saved from excessive brutality so that the 
violence embedded in most forms of eating is maintained, also eschatologically? Did 
the resurrected Christ not eat fish on the beach? 
 (Only) the destructive presence of humans in ecosystems. Is nature only to be 
redeemed from anthropogenic destruction? Is sin (and the evil effects of sin, es-
pecially in terms of structural violence) our only problem? Is it only unnecessary 
suffering, imposed deficiencies and premature death that are to be avoided, while 
other forms of natural suffering are to be embraced, also eschatologically? 
In Christian theology it was traditionally maintained that the primary problem from which 
the world needs to be saved is human sin (i.e. only the last one mentioned in the list above). 
Accordingly, all other forms of suffering are related to the accumulated results of human 
sin (structural violence
3
). The wages of sin is death (Rom 6:23). However, given insights 
from evolutionary biology, this position can hardly be maintained. Pain and death have 
formed part and parcel of sentient life throughout evolutionary history.  
Those who still wish to claim that mortality (as distinct from ‘death’ as alienation from 
God) is the result of sin would need to argue against ample scientific evidence of sickness 
                                                 
3  The term ‘original sin’ is best used not as an account of the origins of sin but for the planetary consequences 
of sin that have become ‘universal’ and inescapable. The term structural violence is a secular equivalent in 
that it describes a situation is which all human beings (and other forms of life) are caught, under which they 
suffer (albeit not equally so) and to which they have contributed (again not equally so). There may well be 
consensus on the universality of sin, if not on an explanation as to why sin has become so universal (Durand 
1978:126). It should be noted that, given this misnomer this contribution therefore does not contribute to 
literature on evolution and ‘original sin’. For a recent discussion, see Edwards (2014:130-146). 
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and death amongst other species long before there were human beings on earth. As Gijsbert 
van den Brink (2011:765) observes, “Death and decay, suffering and starvation have been 
part of the natural world long before humanity appeared on the scene so that nature did not 
‘fall’ into such a state as a result of human behaviour … we human beings ourselves seem 
to have been aggressive savages from the very beginning of our existence. Rather than 
having fallen it seems that we were ‘created fallen’.” Although the fall as a singular his-
torical event may need to be ‘dropped’, one may still wish to retain something like the 
Christian category of sin to redescribe forms of violence that may be regarded as in-
appropriate, excessive,  unnecessary or downright evil. This indicates the need for and the 
possibility of moral judgements.  
In twentieth century theologies that have recognised evolutionary insights one finds a 
widespread recognition that (human) finitude implies forms of vulnerability, fragility, pain, 
suffering and mortality. Such finitude, it is widely asserted, is not the result of sin but forms 
part and parcel of biological existence. Re-described in theological categories, finitude is a 
dimension of God’s good creation and is implied in the very distinction between Creator 
and creature. Human finitude has several dimensions, including limited power and 
knowledge and the anxiety that this induces, but also a sense of transience (perpetual 
perishing), mortality and the anxiety that this induces, also in perfectly healthy organisms.
4
 
Accordingly, the experience of pain is an evolutionary advantage in sentient organisms, 
while sickness and death form an inevitable part of biological functioning. The suffering 
implied therefore cannot be attributed to the consequences of human sin although it may 
certainly be aggravated by sin. Biological evidence for mortality is therefore theologically 
accepted as God’s doing, even as God’s gift to creatures. As Arnold van Ruler (2008:301) 
puts it metaphorically, if the leaves fell from the trees in the Garden of Eden, death was 
already present in God’s good creation. 
I would concur with such a theological affirmation of pain, suffering and mortality as 
part of the created order. Clearly, a distinction between mortality and death as judgement 
and alienation from God is required (see Jüngel 1971). Likewise, a distinction between pain 
impulses and experiences of injustices is necessary. This suggests the need for a distinction 
between so-called natural suffering (sometimes described as ‘natural evil’) and socially-
induced suffering (social evil) that is found widely in contemporary literature (see, e.g. 
Drees 2003).
5
 The difficulty with this distinction is that human beings form part of nature 
so that the human ability to sin originates in the evolution of life (Gestrich 1997:146). Yet, 
the distinction may help humans to distinguish between evil (and suffering) that can be 
avoided and that which cannot be avoided, what we need forgiveness for and what we need 
to come to terms with. 
Such a distinction between natural suffering and socially-induced suffering allows one 
to focus on the primary social problems that are presumably caused by human sin, such as 
economic injustices, violent conflict and anthropogenic environmental destruction (implied 
in the ecumenical call for “Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation”). Such issues are 
                                                 
4  For the distinction between the predicaments of sin (and the evil consequences of sin), finitude in time 
(mortality and transience) and spatial finitude (the limits of human knowledge and power), see Conradie 
(2005).  
5  In German a distinction is made between Böses (human guilt) and Übel (natural evil). Leibniz already 
distinguished between moral evil (human sin), physical or natural evil (suffering) and metaphysical evil (the 
imperfection of things). For Leibniz, moral evil is the result of metaphysical evil, while suffering (natural evil) 
follows from moral evil. For others, human guilt follows from natural suffering so that humans incur such 
guilt as victims. For a discussion, see Gestrich (1997:145-150). 
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addressed in many contemporary theologies including liberation theology, feminist 
theology, black theology, eco-theology and so forth. Put differently, our primary problem is 
not vulnerability but rape, not service but slavery, not death but murder, not sickness but 
the spread of preventable diseases, not economic scarcity or even inequality but capitalism, 
not being ruled but Empire, not the evolution of species but the loss of biodiversity, not an 
always changing climate but anthropogenic climate change, not hunger due to inadequate 
food production but due to its skewed distribution and/or the over-supply of fast food with 
high-sugar and high-fat contents. Accordingly, such forms of oppression, subjugation and 
evil are not necessary, can in principle be avoided and therefore should be resisted. 
By contrast, in other forms of theological discourse (especially in conversation with the 
so-called ‘natural’ sciences) there is (in my view) an unhealthy interest in natural suffering 
as seemingly the primary problem that has to be confronted. The presence of social forms 
of evil is acknowledged, if not taken for granted, but the intriguing problem of natural 
suffering often dominates debates. This leads to an acute interest in the theodicy problem 
(justifying God in view of natural suffering) instead of the required interest in liberation 
from oppression, forgiveness for guilt and complicity, reconciliation amidst alienation and 
victory over evil.
6
 
In some secular discourses there is a temptation to minimise human accountability for 
evil and to treat humans as the ‘innocent’ victims of forces beyond their control. This 
pathologises evil according to the dominant cultural trends where ‘remedies’ may be 
prescribed to overcome ‘diseases’ in ‘patients’. Of course this cannot and does not take 
away legal accountability or social and political responsibility so that the roots of such evil 
remain contested. However, one also finds a temptation to treat the material reality, being 
embodied and the need for consumption,
7
 with Manichean (if not anorexic) disdain so that 
the suffering embedded in evolutionary history itself becomes the primary problem from 
which we have to be rescued, presumably in a radically ‘new creation’. 
In this contribution I will test the distinction between natural suffering and socially-
induced forms of suffering by exploring the roots of inter-species violence with reference to 
the emergence of the act of eating in evolutionary history. I will draw on a corpus of recent 
literature on the consumption of food, especially in the context of Christian eco-theology, 
in order to address the following question: Is the violence associated with what Christians 
would redescribe as sin merely an extrapolation of the violence embedded in the act of 
eating? In other words: Is there a way in which eating can be understood without such 
violence – so that the Protestant intuition that sin is the root cause of evil can be main-
tained? Can the focus on economic injustices, violent conflict and anthropogenic environ-
mental destruction as the primary problems that have to be addressed then be maintained? 
Given this focus on the relationship between natural suffering and socially-induced 
forms of suffering I cannot assume any all too tidy distinctions between animals and human 
animals, nature and culture, biological evolution and cultural evolution, facts and values, 
                                                 
6  For a critique of such positions, see Conradie (2006). 
7  For Martin Versfeld an appreciation for the material is the equivalent of the spiritual. He states: “The good 
life, then, is … where the water or wine we drink … has not lost its corporeality because it is the eternal drink 
which will take away all thirst. Hence we talk of tasting life, of tasting God, the gustation of God, when our 
flesh and blood call for the Living God – our flesh and blood, not a meagre spiritual ego born of desire and 
abstraction and attempting to nourish itself on the thin soup of success” (1983:17). And: “Eating is not only a 
physical process; it is also a spiritual process. Your food could not enter your mouth did it not first enter your 
mind. You are what you eat, but you also eat what you are. You pour a spiritual sauce on what enters your 
mouth, like an act of sex which is clothed with imagination” (1983:52). 
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pre-moral awareness and moral awareness – since such assumptions are precisely under 
investigation. There is obviously some discontinuity between these pairs – so that it would 
be reductionist to equate violence amongst humans with violence in the form of predation 
between non-human species. Be that as it may, there is clearly also some continuity here. It 
is the significance of this continuity that will be assessed here. To say that something has 
gone ‘wrong’ in evolutionary history is therefore not necessarily a moral judgement since 
that would assume that things have only gone wrong with the emergence of moral agents – 
which presumably applies only to human beings but not to all human beings (infants, the 
insane, the comatose and the senile need not be regarded as morally accountable). What has 
gone ‘wrong’ could also refer to weather cycles, the scarcity of resources, viral infections, 
cancer and so forth. Likewise, the term ‘violence’ has to be used here in a minimalist sense. 
It does not necessarily entail moral agency or even intentional agency. Violence may be 
understood provisionally as harm done by one metabolism to another metabolism.
8
 This is 
exemplified by predation and the act of eating, but is also applicable to parasites.  
The category of ‘sin’ is in my view best regarded as a religious and more specifically a 
Christian redescription of what has gone wrong in the world. It would be reductionist to 
regard sin as a moral category only – as it includes connotations of a relatedness with God. 
However, sin clearly also includes moral connotations. Likewise, a moral judgement cannot 
be reduced to a biological or medical diagnosis of what has gone wrong, but it is not 
unrelated to biological and environmental categories either. How, then, is the act of eating 
(maintaining a metabolism) related to a theological redescription of what has gone wrong in 
the world in terms of human sin? 
 
How is Eating related to Human Sin? 
The distinction between natural suffering and social evil seems to underplay the ‘violence’ 
associated with eating. This is expressed in the saying ‘eat or be eaten’ captured in the title 
of this contribution. Technically, one should say eat and be eaten since all organisms that 
eat are eventually eaten themselves (admittedly with some exceptions such as cremation – 
the refusal to be eaten). For some ‘eat or be eaten’ expresses the law of the jungle where 
only the fittest survive, for others the golden rule of corporate America and for yet others 
the name of a board game, a Japanese homoerotic novel or a topic in National Geographic. 
If eating necessarily implies violence, can the contingency of sin be defended? Or is sin 
merely an extrapolation in human evolution of forms of violence that are deeply embedded 
in evolutionary history? 
One may argue that amongst humans eating does not necessarily entail violence or 
killing. Eating is necessary for multi-cellular organisms but predation is only necessary for 
                                                 
8  For a remarkable phenomenological description of the absorption of food by plants and animals, see Jonas 
(1966:102-104). All living organisms require continuous self-renewal through the metabolic process. Plants 
dissolve and absorb nutrients through their roots by a process of osmosis. By contrast, animals require a 
mechanical stage of conveying and shredding before the direct chemical stage of metabolic appropriation. 
Through their roots plants are relieved of the necessity of movement, while such mobility enhances the 
freedom of animals but this implies a more precarious metabolism, an inability to become fully integrated in 
its environment and a temporal discontinuity between need and satisfaction. This gap between animal organ-
ism and environment is spanned by the role of perception, emotional embeddedness and mobility. All animal 
life is therefore parasitic on plant life. Jonas comments: “Thus animal metabolism makes mediate action 
possible; but it also makes it necessary. The animal, feeding on existing life, continually destroys its mortal 
supply and has to seek elsewhere for more. In the case of flesh-eaters, whose food is itself motile, the need is 
increased in proportion and forces the mutual development of that agility in which so many other faculties of 
the animal must participate” (p. 105). 
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carnivores; others can rely on organic leftovers (e.g. seeds, fruit and nuts).
9
 Eating fruit that 
fell from the tree hardly involves killing other living organisms (plants or other animals), 
terminating the functioning of their metabolisms. At most such eating prevents the ability 
of such seeds to reproduce but even that is not necessarily the case: one may eat an apple 
and in the process help distribute its seeds. In any case, given the conditions of spatial 
finitude, not every acorn produced in one season can become a full-grown oak tree. One 
may condone eating the eggs of some birds on the same basis. In the case of grains (maize, 
wheat, rice, corn), a one-year plant is perhaps cut prematurely to harvest its seeds but it 
seems that violence remains restricted. The growth of some plants may be stimulated by 
cutting (and eating) their leaves so that some symbiosis is possible between herbivores and 
the plants on which they feed. It is a different matter with vegetables and roots – where the 
carrot has to be uprooted in order to be eaten. To grow fruit and vegetables also require 
some pest control regarding insects, snails and rodents. 
The real difficulty comes with eating other living organisms in the form of fish or meat. 
The issue here is not so much a plea for self-induced vegetarian or vegan diets amongst 
humans (see Grumett, & Muers 2010), but that human eating habits are in continuity with a 
long lineage of carnivores and omnivores. Hunting and fishing (and not only gathering) 
evidently formed part of the earliest human cultures so that the consumption of food is 
governed by the relationship between predator and prey. Hunting may be said to be 
beneficial for both predator and prey, but this assumes the need for killing and an 
acceptance of the need for the survival of the fittest. Numerous studies in animal ethology 
have rightly pointed out that an emphasis on competition is one-sided since relationships 
within and between species are also characterised by symbiosis, cooperation (for hunting!) 
and also compassion. Animals rarely kill except in hunger or self-defence. When they 
threaten it is precisely for the sake of avoiding combat.
10
 However, the role of hunting and 
preying in food consumption can hardly be denied. In early hominid evolution eating meat 
evidently contributed much towards the proteins necessary for growth in brain size. 
Vegetarian or vegan eating habits are now possible, but humans would not have evolved 
without hunting for meat. 
Such eating entails killing and induces anxiety amongst those sentient animals that are 
to be killed and swallowed. If so, this raises deeper theological problems. Are we to be 
redeemed from eating meat and fish? Should all carnivores confess their sins and change 
their ways, as the imagery in Isaiah 11 seems to suggest? Should herbivores refrain from 
eating living plants and restrict themselves to organic leftovers from fallen leaves and dead 
plants? Would this make any sense in terms of evolutionary history? Moreover, is it not a 
fallacy to assume that not eating meat can avoid the death of other organisms through 
gardening (including vegetables, micro-organisms and killing rodents and other ‘pests’)? 
Why are the lives of other animals regarded as more precious than the lives of plants and 
other organisms? Does this not re-introduce hierarchical thinking with humans at the top of 
                                                 
9  Admittedly, a world without carnivores is hard to imagine. Holmes Rolston (1994:213-214) rightly insists that 
“Even grazers are predators of a kind, though what they eat does not suffer. Again, an Earth with only 
herbivores and no omnivores or carnivores would be impoverished – the animal skills demanded would be 
only a fraction of those that have resulted in actual zoology – no horns, no fleet-footed predators or prey, no 
fine-tuned eyesight and hearing, no quick neural capacity, no advanced brains. We humans stand in this 
tradition, as our ancestors were hunters. We really cannot envision a world, on any Earth more or less like our 
own, which can give birth to the myriad forms of life that have been generated here, without some things 
eating other things.”  
10  See for example the classic study by Mary Midgley (1995), especially the chapter on “Animals and the 
Problem of Evil” (pp. 25-49). 
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the food pyramid? To assume that eating does not imply death may well hide a Gnostic if 
not a Manichean tendency, a refusal to accept creation on God’s terms (Wirzba 2011:135). 
If eating inevitably involves killing, is a sharp distinction between the suffering em-
bedded in evolution and that which is induced by sin still possible? Put succinctly, is human 
sin merely a way of aggravating the violence that is embedded in evolutionary processes 
and expressed through the need of complex organisms to obtain food through eating? If so, 
nature is then included in the fall of humanity, not merely in terms of the impact of sin but 
also in the gradual progression of falling in sentient, mammalian, hominid and human 
evolution. Then nature and evil, creation and fall become conflated so that the contingency 
of sin is abandoned. Falling is unavoidable, indeed inevitable.   
One may still argue that all human forms of eating are historically embedded in societal 
structures that have greatly exacerbated violence. This has developed in line with popu-
lation growth and conflict over resources. Agriculture was necessary to accommodate such 
population growth and was enabled by human cooperation, but it also aggravated the nature 
and scale of conflict between societies. This line of thinking would allow and indeed invite 
a critique of the injustices and inequalities underlying the production, distribution and 
consumption of food (the elitism of eating fruits and nuts, the transport of vegetables out of 
season, commercialised meat production, the undermining of soil fertility through the use 
of irrigation, fertilisers and pesticides, etc.).
11
 The Protestant intuition is that these are the 
primary problems to be addressed and that the way eating is portrayed in the previous 
paragraph remains hypothetical since it is abstracted from current economic systems. 
Nevertheless, the danger is that capitalist food systems can justify their practices precisely 
in the name of a survival of the fittest: Eat or be eaten! 
Another way of addressing such problems, going back a few billion years in evolu-
tionary history to the earliest forms of life, is to consider the patterns through which 
bacteria sustain themselves. Three such patterns emerge: Parasitic bacteria feed themselves 
by killing their hosts. Others live in their hosts but help their hosts, for example to digest 
food. Some heterotrophic bacteria absorb dead organic material such as decomposing 
leaves and flesh. By contrast autotrophic bacteria create their own food. Some autotrophs 
feed themselves through photosynthesis, i.e. by using sunlight, carbon dioxide, water, 
metallic elements such as calcium, potassium and sodium and other chemicals such as 
nitrogen, ammonia, phosphorus and sulphur to synthesise food and to release oxygen in the 
process, while others perform chemosynthesis.  
From a theological point of view this raises the possibility of locating the fall from 
grace within early evolutionary history, i.e. the emergence of parasitic bacteria that not only 
live off their hosts but also kill their hosts in order to obtain food. Is God therefore 
responsible for allowing such parasitic bacteria to emerge so that humans and other 
omnivores may claim that their way of eating is God’s doing, according to their Creator’s 
will? 
Let me pause here for a moment to consider the theological questions that are at stake:  
It is clear on the basis of evolutionary biology and studies on animal ethology that pre-
human evolution is characterised by a capacity for both conflict on the basis of self-
interest and cooperation.
12
 Both are illustrated by eating patterns: killing others for food, 
                                                 
11  A discussion of such problems related to the production, distribution and consumption of food is found widely 
in the literature on contemporary Christian eco-theology. See, for example, Northcott (2007:232-266), 
Wallace (2010:77-97), Wirzba (2011:71-109) 
12  Denis Edwards (2014:142) rightly observes that, amongst humans, cooperation is not necessarily virtuous (we 
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cooperating with others in doing so and providing food for others (for off-spring and 
micro-organisms living inside an organism but also through the death of any organism). 
It is also clear from human history that we have a capacity for compassion and conflict, 
for forming social contracts and for structural violence that victimises others (and not 
only human others). Again both are illustrated by the production, distribution and 
consumption of food in the wake of the agricultural and industrial revolutions. There is 
clearly some continuity between pre-human evolution and further developments in 
human history. There is also some discontinuity that may be associated with the 
emergence of consciousness, self-consciousness and symbolic consciousness, with the 
evolution of various degrees of freedom, with a sense of anxiety over finitude, with the 
emergence of forms of culture, religion, and complex societies that allowed for further 
population growth. 
The Christian category of sin has been used to capture and redescribe this discontinuity by 
indicating what is wrong in the world, to identify the roots of evil and to judge the interplay 
between compassion and conflict. The moral assessment is clear: things are not what they 
could be and should be. On this assessment there might well be consensus between 
different brands of Christianity, different religious traditions, social analysts and secular 
critics alike.  
However, within Christianity itself, there have emerged rather different ways of 
interpreting this assessment, leading to very different ways of telling the story of creation, 
sin and salvation.
13
 Historically, the Augustinian version of the story has been dominant. 
One may say that it is built on four core intuitions, namely a sense of original righteousness 
(based on an affirmation of the goodness of God’s creation), the contingency of the fall as 
an event in history (expressed in the motto of posse non peccare),
14
 the inescapable impact 
of sin and evil (expressed in the motto of non posse non peccare) – prompting a recognition 
of the need for God’s grace (salvation understood as God’s work, not as ours, in Christ 
extra nos and through the Spirit in us). Amongst those who affirm the Augustinian version 
of the story, despite its inherent inability to explain the origin of sin,
15
 some of the details of 
Augustine’s position are deeply contested and even widely discarded, e.g. the literal inter-
pretation of Genesis 1-3, the historicity of Adam’s fall, the assumption that mortality is the 
result of the fall, the transmission of guilt through sexual intercourse and the quasi-material 
understanding of grace. Nevertheless, both the historical contingency and the contemporary 
inescapability of sin are maintained in order to affirm human complicity for the many 
manifestations of evil in society. This is held together by the notion of the fall as a 
historical process, if not as an isolated punctiliar event. If creation and fall are not regarded 
                                                                                                                            
can cooperate in economic exploitation), while self-affirmation is not necessarily a vice (it can be based on a 
sense of dignity, it can aid an exercising of moral conscience and can help to resist conformity). 
13  I have discussed different ways of telling the story of God’s work in a long-term project on “The Earth in 
God’s economy”. See Conradie (2015). 
14  See the comment by Cornelius Plantinga (1995:88): “Sin is an anomaly, an intruder, a notorious gate-crasher. 
Sin does not belong to God’s world, but somehow it has gotten in.”  
15  The classic Augustinian position rejects both dualist explanations (a rival power as the cause of sin – which 
undermines God’s sovereignty) and monist explanations (which render God ultimately responsible for human 
sin). Instead sin is regarded as incomprehensible, as something that should not have been, could not have been 
but nevertheless is. The problem is that sin is either rendered impossible by the created perfection of human 
beings (implying their presumed original righteousness) or is made inevitable by the recognition of some 
inherent flaw that renders them vulnerable to temptation (which ultimately makes God responsible for sin). As 
Williams (1985:209) observes, “The classic doctrine is impaled on the first horn of the dilemma (original 
righteousness excludes sin), while modern theological reconstructions are confronted with the other (to 
acknowledge a flaw seems to equate finitude with sin.” 
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as separate historical events, then the contingency of sin is lost – so that Manichean dualism 
or Pelagian optimism seems to be the only viable options (see Williams 1985:213). 
Can this Augustinian approach be maintained in the light of the violence associated with 
eating – i.e. given the continuity between pre-human evolution and the contemporary 
interplay between compassion and conflict? In other words: Can the contingency of human 
sin be maintained in the light of the violence embedded in evolutionary history – which is 
for example manifested in predation and most forms of eating?
16
 And can the Protestant 
emphasis on sin as the primary problem at which the message of salvation is directed 
(leading to a confession of sin) still be maintained in the light of our evolutionary heritage? 
In short then: is the Augustinian posse non peccare plausible given the functioning of 
predation in the food chain?
17
 
One may well raise the question whether a Manichean approach is not more plausible in 
order to recognise the inevitability of forms of violence in evolutionary history? Such an 
approach is not easy to avoid once the continuity of violence associated with eating 
throughout evolutionary history is recognised. In response to this recognition, one may 
follow different routes, including the hope for Gnostic forms of redemption that eschew 
embodiment altogether through an escape into virtual reality, social Darwinism that 
legitimises the struggle for the survival of the fittest in a neo-liberal capitalist context, a 
pathologising of evil that seeks therapy for the always innocent victims of evil, or even a 
return to authoritarian military rule to minimise the violence associated with conflict or to 
protect access to scarce resources. One may also argue that the world is not necessarily evil, 
but that there is at least a tragic dimension in all forms of life – for which human beings are 
not responsible – and which requires a distinction between goodness and perfection. This 
tragic aspect entails vulnerability, finitude and anxiety but cannot be equated with sin. This 
is indeed the line followed by many contemporary theologians but it is not clear (to me) 
whether this can be reconciled with an Augustinian approach. This seems possible only if 
killing for food is underplayed. 
Alternatively, is a Pelagian approach not even more plausible in the light of evolu-
tionary history? This will allow one to affirm that there is indeed “something good in 
everything I see” and that this helps one to “cope with anything” (as ABBA sings in “I have 
a dream”)? Does the good not outweigh evil, despite the tendencies towards violence that 
may also be found in each human and indeed in other animals? Should we not rather 
                                                 
16  As Gijsbert van den Brink (2013:772) notes, “if sin is a historically contingent rather than a metaphysically 
necessary phenomenon, it is not bound up with human nature and therefore we can in principle be liberated 
from it without losing our humanity.” 
17  While Theophilus of Antioch believed that predation resulted from the fall, Augustine in fact argued that it 
was simply an aspect of the created order that one animal is the nourishment of another. To wish that it were 
otherwise would not be reasonable. Likewise, Thomas Aquinas criticised those who thought there had been no 
predation among animals before the Fall. The question is nevertheless whether human sin may be regarded as 
an extrapolation of the violence embedded in predation. Bimson (2006:73) concludes that, “Unlike many in 
the modem West, estranged from nature and inclined to sentimentalise it, the Hebrew poets had no problem 
with the natural world’s being the way it is. They were fully aware of nature’s redness in tooth and claw, and 
its apparent wastefulness, but did not find this incompatible with belief in a wise and loving Creator; they thus 
saw no need to invoke a ‘cosmic fall’ to excuse those aspects that we find offensive.” Indeed, it is the wisdom 
of Qoheleth that prevails: “There is nothing better for mortals than to eat and drink, and find enjoyment in 
their toil. This also, I saw, is from the hand of God; for apart from him who can eat or who can have 
enjoyment? For to the one who pleases him God gives wisdom and knowledge and joy; but to the sinner he 
gives the work of gathering and heaping, only to give to one who pleases God. This also is vanity and a 
chasing after wind” (2:24-26, NRSV). This may well be sound counsel, as long as it is recognised that, in an 
evolutionary context, eating also implies being eaten!  
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embrace our mixed evolutionary heritage, the inclinations towards compassion and towards 
conflict, so that we need to muster the forces of goodness in us (emphasising the human 
will on the basis of the emergence of human freedom) in order to overcome evil, with some 
help from the ‘medicine’ of God’s grace, if not with the appropriate management of the 
best available technologies? Does it not make more moral sense to save ourselves and to 
emphasise our capabilities for doing so? Should we not heed the activist calls to “save the 
earth” from anthropogenic destruction, relying on our collective efforts to do so? Or, more 
pessimistically, do we have to do the best we can under the circumstances in order to create 
a somewhat better world, with some guidance from God’s Word? One may then interpret 
the fall as the inability to rise towards a higher vision (not a fall from a pristine beginning) 
that became possible through the emergence of human freedom. In other words, is the 
Christian dialectic between being created in God’s image and the fall not best understood as 
a symbolic rendering of our ambiguous evolutionary past that is constituted by both our 
genes and our cultural heritage?
18
  
If so, although creation and fall may become conflated here (so that ‘sin’ is regarded as 
more or less inevitable, even as necessary), unlike classic Pelagian positions where sin is 
regarded as purely contingent so that it is possible to avoid sin, human freedom can still be 
affirmed in evolutionary terms, following the emergence of self-consciousness. In revised 
Pelagian terms sin then has to be understood as our inability/unwillingness to do the best 
we can to make the world a better place, while salvation is probably best regarded in terms 
of the imitation of Christ’s inspiring kenotic example. This will help to emphasise our 
genetic tendency towards compassion rather than conflict. In other words: eating (and 
killing) others may be condoned as long as this is done with limited violence, for the sake 
of altruism and as long as one allows oneself to be eaten in the end. 
In the subsequent discussion I will investigate three paths to address the question as 
stated above, namely: Is the violence associated with sin merely an extrapolation of the 
‘violence’ embedded in the act of eating? The subtext of this question is whether a 
Manichean or Pelagian approach to address this question is not more plausible than an 
Augustinian one.
19
 
 
The Human Condition: Striving for Food 
In his book Good and Evil: Interpreting a Human Condition (1990), the late Edward Farley 
maintains an Augustinian intuition that sin is best understood as a distortion of reality and 
more specifically of three overlapping spheres of human reality that he identifies and 
describes, namely the inter-personal, the societal and individual agency. He argues that the 
tragic character of human existence is given under the conditions of finitude and that well-
being, together with aspects such as creativity, affection and the experience of beauty, are 
only possible and are interdependent with situations of limitation, frustration, disappoint-
ment, vulnerability, challenge and suffering (p. 29). He argues that sin cannot be identified 
                                                 
18  See the comment by Philip Hefner (1993:139), “What we have called sin is inherent in human being because 
it is a constituent of the process that makes life possible in the first place and that contribute to life’s 
development. Thus, even though we are aware of sin and feel its pain (guilt), sin is not present because of 
some prior evil action or evil nature. The guilt is better understood as a response to our inherent inability to 
satisfy all the messages that are delivered to our central nervous systems, rather than as a response to an evil 
act committed in primordial past of the race.”  
19  The other available options would be to condone the survival of the fittest along neo-Darwinian or 
Nietzschean lines, or to radicalise an ascetic prescription, namely to become food for others sooner rather 
later. 
http://scriptura.journals.ac.za 
Eat and/ or be Eaten: The Evolutionary Roots of Violence?                                   11 
with the tragic dimension of our phylogenetic heritage (our vulnerability to injury, disease, 
pain, degeneration and death), our social needs and vulnerabilities or the very fact and act 
of individual consciousness. That would be tantamount to Manicheism (p. 61). Sin, 
however, is also not purely related to the realm of consciousness or the subject. That would 
amount to dualism (p. 77). What is evil is not the body, the personal and the social, but evil 
appropriates and corrupts all these spheres. 
In a chapter on “The biological aspect of personal being” Farley describes ‘striving’ as 
the most general feature of the human biological condition. Humans have to cope with a 
dangerous environment where they have to avoid what could prey on them, harm them and 
compete with them. We strive for nourishment and space and against whatever may 
interfere or withhold what is needed. We have survival-oriented needs for fresh air, water, 
food, warmth and safety and genetically rooted tendencies for reproduction and acceptance 
that are clothed in cultural wrappings (pp. 89-91). Such needs and tendencies imply a 
degree of aggression to resist, defend and oppose where need be. However, Farley main-
tains that there is a distinction between benign and malignant aggression (pp. 92, 94) so that 
such aggression (self-assertiveness if not anger) is not by itself an expression of human sin. 
There is no one-way causality between genes and behaviour since that would ignore the 
role of flexibility, human self-transcendence and acculturation (p. 93). We are bioche-
mically equipped to maintain the conditions of our existence so that our biology disposes us 
towards a range of satisfactions and to oppose whatever threatens that (p. 95). That forms 
part of what Farley calls ‘tragic existence’ (the inescapable interplay between satisfaction 
and suffering) under the conditions of finitude – which can become distorted but should not 
be conflated with evil. Sin is therefore a contingent and malignant expression of such 
striving.
20
  
For Farley, human evil therefore has a distinctive dynamics that is different from tragic 
existence and its vulnerabilities and from the dynamics of pathology and therapy (p. 117). 
He argues that the intrinsic vulnerability and tragic character of human existence form the 
background and the place of origin (but not so much the necessary cause) that allows for 
and evokes the dynamics of evil (p. 118). Tragic existence entails vulnerability (injury, 
suffering death), competitiveness, worry, anxiety, the fragility of one’s social world and 
self-conscious experiences of discontent (pp. 121-124). Farley observes that the differen-
tiation between sin and tragedy is one of the seminal insights of the Hebraic tradition  
(p. 125). Evil is not a fateful inevitability but a contingent response to the anxiety and 
discontent that characterise tragic existence (pp. 126, 128). It is a response that seeks to 
overcome such vulnerability and to provide a securing foundation (e.g. through religion, 
science, art, the nation, institutions, social movements – p. 133). The desperate attempt to 
find something, anything that can remove the discontent and vulnerability of human 
existence through penultimate satisfaction is idolatry (pp. 134-135). Farley therefore insists 
that evil is a contingent response to tragic existence. He identifies at least three other 
                                                 
20  In another chapter Farley discusses the role of ‘elemental passions’ for survival and well-being, for inter-
human confirmation and intimacy, and for a sense of reality. He argues that in the same way that self-assertion 
and even aggression form part of tragic existence (given the unbridgeable gap between desiring and the 
satisfaction of such desires) and cannot be equated to sin, desire (and a certain egocentrism) may become 
distorted through sin but cannot be equated with sin. Here too he resists a Manichean tendency to equate sin 
with the conditions of finitude and the desires and anxieties associated with being self-consciously finite (see 
p. 101 in conversation with Wolfhart Pannenberg). The passions are structured tragically but not evil (against 
Manicheism; they are nevertheless corruptible and corrupted (and not merely subject to pathology and 
redeemable though therapy – see p. 172). 
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responses to tragic vulnerability, namely to regard vulnerability as pathological injury, to 
dull the discontent through various distractions and bravado. He thus resists contemporary 
tendencies to regard expressions of evil as a form of pathology (symptoms of stress, 
neurosis, phobias, syndromes, depression) that requires therapy for the somehow innocent 
perpetrators (p. 137). 
In another chapter Farley explores the ways in which bodily life is corrupted through 
the sin of idolatry. He insists that being embodied is not the culprit for human life (as 
maintained in Manicheism), but that it can indeed be corrupted so that wickedness is not 
merely a sickness or pathology that requires therapeutic treatment (p. 212). He argues that 
our bodily needs and desires for food, comfort, survival, healing and sexual intimacy imply 
tendencies towards satisfaction and competition but that neither may be associated with sin. 
All these strivings are rooted in our biological make-up but are also shaped by symbolic 
language and culture. He adds that “Biologically rooted but culturally extended urges 
towards various satisfactions constitute the primary form of our natural egocentrism”  
(p. 214). Such egocentrism is associated with primary urges to maintain the integrity of life, 
the elemental passions and the subtle pleasures of human culture but are not sinful or evil, 
not even harmful. Given the fragility of the body, striving for also implies striving against 
various perils such as inclement weather, insects and bacteria and the predatory behaviour 
of other animals (p. 215). Farley acknowledges that we hunt, gather, harvest and kill for 
food and that we also compete with each other for food and also for mates, territory, status 
and rights with a degree of antipathy, anger and aggression (p. 215). However, he insists 
that “Being biologically equipped to oppose our own kind does not mean that our hormones 
and enzymes have fated us for murder and warfare” (p. 215). Such physiological equipment 
for opposition is not itself evil or the cause of evil. He concludes that “Because we desire 
well-being, we are ready to oppose, to have antipathy for those who would threaten our 
mate, our child, or our lives. And this readiness originates not from the dynamics of evil but 
our evolutionary heritage” (p. 216). Evil does not come from the impulses that our phylo-
geny has fostered on us (p. 216). Evil can co-opt bodily urges but such urges are not by 
themselves corrupt or even corruptible (in the same way that one’s skeleton or lungs cannot 
become morally corrupted – p. 218). The corruption of biologically rooted desires has to do 
with reified cultural expressions of the frustration of such desires (p. 222). Our need for 
food does not determine what we eat, how much we eat, when and where we eat or in 
whose company we eat. Sin therefore remains contingent. Our bodily needs, drives and 
desires are not the cause of evil although these may at least be a sine qua non for the 
distortions effected by sin (p. 221). Wickedness does not flow directly from anger or 
aggression, but distorts that through stories, traditions and institutions of war, violence and 
revenge (p. 223). 
In this way Farley defends what I describe as the contingency of evil. Pain, suffering 
and death form an integral part of life, as do self-affirmation, aggression and a certain 
egocentrism. However, cruelty, evil and injustice, while rooted in human capabilities are 
distortions of the human condition. Does Farley perhaps underestimate the violence 
embedded in acts of eating with his notion of tragic existence? 
 
Eating as Intimacy: A Kenotic Evolutionary Principle? 
We are not only genetically related to other forms of life but also dependent upon them. 
Although there may be competition for food and security among species and specimens, the 
very existence of food chains suggests an inter-dependence between species. As Thomas 
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Berry suggests somewhere, this constitutes a form of intimacy, not enmity. Trillions  
of micro-organisms form a necessary part of our own bodies. We share the same space 
which other species inhabit. From before birth until after death we form part of an intricate 
food chain. Or in the words of Martin Versfeld: “Partaking of food is the partaking  
of reality.” 
This suggests the need to undermine binary oppositions regarding eating as if the 
absorption of food can be classified in terms of enmity and intimacy, what is inside and 
what is outside. When animals eat, they transfer energy derived from bacteria into another 
organism but in the process also feed numerous organisms living inside them. They 
themselves form part of larger ecosystems that are more fluid and interdependent than is 
often assumed.  Our human bodies have porous boundaries, as eating and the excretion of 
body fluids indicate. This is illustrated precisely by intimacy – as is the case of mothers 
nursing babies, between lovers and in sport. It is therefore facetious to make clear 
distinctions between subjects and their bodies, materials and meaning. The food that we eat 
not only shapes our bodies, our moods and our self-image but also our physiology and in 
the long run, the evolution of our species.
21
 From the perspective of ecosystems it is not 
possible to identify discrete, individual organisms since the life of any one organism is 
intertwined with that of others. In the language of deep ecology the Self is not restricted to 
an individual self but to the emergence of Life itself. In the human species the evolving 
universe has to come to self-consciousness.  
Sallie McFague (2013:21) refers to the example of a nurse log, i.e. lying down trees that 
have lived standing up for hundreds of years and now provide a nutrient-rich environment 
for young saplings to grow. The nurse log can live another several hundred years as the 
giver of new life. She concludes: “It all works by symbiosis – living off one another. 
Nothing in an old-growth forest can go it alone; nothing could survive by itself; everything 
in the forest is interrelated and interdependent: all flora and fauna eat from, live from the 
others” (2013:21). From this perspective, eating does not so much imply the killing of 
individual organisms but a transfer of energy through absorption and excretion to support 
the flourishing of the whole ecosystem. 
On the basis of such a perspective a significant number of scholars in the field of eco-
theology have detected a kenotic principle in evolutionary history – and indeed underlying 
cosmic history.
22
 The argument here is that evolution is not characterized only by 
competition towards the survival of the fittest but also by self-giving. This is already 
evident in the ‘death’ of stars since planets are made from the ‘ashes’ of ‘dead’ stars. It is 
especially characteristic of the death of individual living organisms that ‘give’ their bodies 
to become food for other organisms. It should be noted that kenosis is treated as a principle 
here. It is not a contingent response to the impact of evil (see below), but a description of 
“the moral nature of the universe” (Ellis and Murphy 1996). 
A more nuanced treatment is found in Sallie McFague’s Blessed are the Consumers 
(2013). Following Holmes Rolston (2001), she is careful not to identify a continuity of 
                                                 
21  One may even argue that cooking food played an important role on human evolution. Wrangham (2009) 
observes that humans are the only species that cook their food and that this had a profound evolutionary 
impact since it increased food efficiency and allowed our human ancestors to spend less time foraging for 
food.  
22  There are too many scholars to mention here, but the volume edited by Polkinghorne (2001) certainly set the 
tone for others to follow. Besides the work of Sallie McFague discussed here, one may also mention 
contributions by Denis Edwards, George Ellis, John Haught and Christopher Southgate – who are involved in 
discourse on theology and the sciences 
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kenotic tendencies in nature (p. 146). She recognises the role of competition and inter-
dependence. Evolution is the process of life preying on life. Advanced life requires food 
pyramids; eating and being eaten (p. 146). If organisms ‘sacrifice’ their lives for others in 
their environment, this does not take place consciously: “it works in a self-interested fashion 
but within a system of interdependencies that demands ‘sharing’” (pp. 146-147). She adds 
that one cannot have life without losing it. To receive energy is at once to live and to kill other 
lives before they enter our mouths (p. 148). Inversely, all living creatures have to die and in 
the process contribute to the lives of others beyond their own. This is radicalised in the 
Christian faith which embraces a God who dies so that new life may be possible (p. 159). It is 
the power of love to let others be. With Dorothy Sölle she states that her wish is that creation 
should remain alive more than to remain alive herself while everything else should die to 
make that possible. McFague thus ventures to suggest: 
What we love is not individual eternal life for ourselves so much as the continuation of 
the entire awesome, beautiful abundance of creatures, great and small, that causes us to 
gasp in wonder and thanksgiving that we have, at least for a short time, been a part of 
this glorious creation. We wish it to continue, not only in our nearest and dearest (our 
children, our tribe, our country and our species) but also in all the forms, from slugs to 
stars, that lie outside our daily appreciation but are necessary to the health of the whole 
(pp. 165-166). 
On this basis McFague proposes a kenotic theology as a body theology through the sharing 
of scarce resources among the needy. It focuses on food as most basic need that organisms 
have for survival (p. 171). A kenotic theology, she says, “is not a lofty theology glorifying 
‘God or man’; rather it is a theology that begins with need, both God’s need and ours, a 
need that runs all the way from the most elemental biological processes of the energy 
transformation to understanding the Trinity (the being of God) as one of continuous and 
total exchange of love” (p. 172). Life is only possible through the shared sacrifice of all for 
others (p. 185). Indeed when we die we become food for others and so we are “received 
back into the great sea of life and love which is God” (p. 186). Creation is about bodies, 
about flesh and food and therefore about the economics of just, sustainable sharing of the 
world’s resources for all the needy (p. 198). To give oneself is ultimately to give one’s 
body as food for other bodies in order to keep such bodies flourishing (p. 201). The kenotic 
love at the heart of the Christian faith is therefore captured by the symbol of food (p. 202). 
She says: 
Food is the sine qua non of existence; it sums up the entire corporeal planet, which is 
created by energy and is sustained by food; the evolutionary story is the tale of who gets 
food and who does not; and wars increasingly will be fought over food. As we consider 
the dual crises facing our planet – climate change and unjust resource distribution – we 
see that they are all about food. If we take the mother-child relationship as a quintessen-
tial example of what we mean by compassion or empathy – responding to the deepest 
need of another – then the mother’s giving food from her body to the infant can be seen 
as the model of radical kenotic love. It is no accident, then, that food appears so 
frequently in the Christian story and that its central ritual, the Eucharist, is a common 
meal in which the disciples give food to one another as Christ gave his body as bread and 
wine for all (p. 202). 
On this basis McFague concludes: 
The classic doctrine of Christian discipleship, that, made in the image of God, human 
beings should embody the kenotic love of God, means that our bodies must be on the 
line. In other words, food (and the whole planetary apparatus that goes to produce food 
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for billions of creatures) should become the central task at all levels, personal lifestyle 
choices, and public policies (p. 203). 
Although McFague seeks to avoid a continuity between kenotic tendencies in nature, the 
kenotic love of God and Christian discipleship, she does not regard kenosis as a contingent 
response to human sin. Instead, kenosis seems to be a self-conscious expression of a 
tendency also found in others forms of life that counter-balances the tendency towards 
aggressive self-affirmation found in eating by absorbing other living organisms. How 
should sin then be understood? McFague does discuss sin in several of her works, e.g. as 
“the refusal to accept our place”, the refusal to know and to accept our limitations 
(1993:112) and therefore as the human encroaching on the space, the habitats of other 
species (1993:100-101). Salvation is then understood accordingly, namely in terms of the 
imitation of Christ’s example of self-sacrifice.23 What it means to be a human being is 
simply to choose to be what one is: a participant in the God’s very own life of love 
(McFague 2013b:31). She explains this in terms of a kenotic view of God: 
Jesus’ whole life was a lead-up of total giving to others, culminating in the cross where 
he sacrificed his life, not for the atonement of humanity’s sins, but as a witness to the 
totally unexpected and overwhelming gift of God’s own self as the answer to our 
questions about who we are and how we should live (McFague 2013b:29). 
And: 
We live by participating in God’s very own life (since this is the only reality there is), 
but not simply as parts of God; rather, human life is learning to live into the relationality 
of God’s own life, which is one of self-emptying love for others … And, according to 
the kenotic paradigm, this is what ‘salvation’ is: not release from punishment for our 
sins, but a call to relate to all others (from God to homeless persons and drought-ridden 
trees) as God would and does (McFague 2013b:33). 
 
The Eucharist as a Contingent Self-sacrifice 
In his significant book entitle Food and Faith: A Theology of Eating (2011), Norman 
Wirzba responds to the degraded understanding of the meaning of food in advanced 
industrial societies where speed, convenience and cheap prices have become the most 
valued drivers in food consumption. He observes that eating has become thoughtless and 
irresponsible, lacking the sensitivity, imagination and understanding that come from 
growing, preserving and preparing food: “though everyone chews, relatively few eat with 
much understanding of or sympathy for the widespread destruction of the world’s 
agricultural lands and communities or for the misery of billions of factory-produced 
chickens, sheep, pigs and cattle” (p. xiii). His focus is clearly on a critique of consumerist 
patterns in North America so that issues of food security and hunger are recognised but not 
                                                 
23  Elsewhere McFague (2013:23) critiques the classic Christian view of God’s actions. She says: “This mythic 
story focuses on God’s actions – God is the protagonist of the world drama – and … speaks to our concerns 
about why the world was made, who is in charge of it, why it is no longer harmonious, and how it is made 
‘right’ again. This story does not speak to our interest in the world or how we should act toward our neigh-
bours. Human beings are, in fact, minor players in the classic Christian story of creation and providence. 
Moreover, the action does not occur in our physical neighbourhoods, the actual spaces and places we inhabit, 
but over our heads, as it were, in the vast panoramic historical sweep of time, with its beginning (creation), 
middle (redemption), and end (eschatology). In each of these events God is totally in charge; we, at most, like 
good children are grateful to our all-mighty, all-loving Father and try to follow his will. Even when sin and 
evil divert the drama from its triumphant course (and cause us to lose faith and hope), the lord of history will 
prevail, the king will be victorious. 
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foregrounded (the term ‘hunger’ does not appear in the index!). In response he sets out to 
develop a theological vision of the ways in which we grow and taste food and of what 
eating is meant to be in the kingdom of God (p. xv). 
To his credit Wirzba recognises from the outset that eating (for the sake of preserving 
life), also vegetarian eating, depends on death. Death is eating’s steadfast accomplice (p. 1). 
There is no such thing as ‘cheap’ or ‘convenient’ food. Eating is a movement that takes 
place through the death of others and ends up in death. Wirzba says: “Eating is the daily 
reminder of creaturely mortality. We eat to live, knowing that without food we will starve 
and die. But to eat we must also kill, realizing that without the deaths of others – microbes, 
insects, plants, animals – we can have no food” (pp. 110-111). 
Wirzba recognises that accepting the gift of life, to acknowledge that suffering and 
death accompanies every diet, is an extraordinarily difficult thing to do if one is conscious 
that this implies receiving the deaths of others. Nevertheless, Wirzba assumes that eating is 
not itself an effect or sign of a fallen creation, although eating takes on a different character 
after the fall (see p. 1, note 3). Eating reminds us that we are not self-subsisting gods, “that 
we participate in a grace-saturated world, a blessed creation worthy of attention, care and 
celebration” (p. 2). To receive food as a gift and as a declaration of God’s love and joy is to 
understand food in a theological manner (p. 11). This, Wirzba believes, transforms the way 
we eat. Eating is not merely reducible to the consumption of others; we eat in order to 
share, sustain and nurture life, to accept responsibility for another’s well-being. Eating 
implies hospitality, to enter into communion and to be reconciled with each other: “To eat 
with God at the table is to eat with the aim of healing and celebrating the memberships of 
creation” (p. 11). Food is a gift from God to be gratefully received and generously shared 
(p. 12). 
This theological vision of eating implies that the goal of eating is not to worship food or 
to bow down before the modern idols of control, efficiency and convenience (p. 11). Where 
eating becomes idolatrous the result is degraded habitats, miserable animals, abused 
workers, unjust trade agreements and lonely eaters (p. 12). By contrast, through the spiri-
tual consciousness of a prayer of gratitude, food ceases to be merely fuel or a commodity; 
“Eating becomes the sharing in and a sharing of the blessings of God” (p. 33). Eating places 
us within the garden and it within us (p. 59). 
Wirzba treasures the image of a garden with God as the first Gardener and us as 
gardeners to indicate that sustainable food production is possible. This implies the 
recognition of boundaries. To live as if there are no boundaries is to claim to be a god  
(p. 75). To treasure one’s membership of the garden that makes life possible is to 
acknowledge the responsibility to serve and protect the garden. To eat from the garden is to 
understand that we cannot thrive alone and that we depend on others for our sustenance and 
health (pp. 75, 109). Life itself is resurrection from the death of others – of chickens, 
chicory and chickpeas. To live is to be perpetually rising from the dead. To reject death is 
to reject the soil from which life comes forth (p. 133, drawing from Robert Farrar Capon). 
If eating implies killing, how can one then eat without sinning? The message of the 
gospel does not address this speculative question. Instead, it responds to and transforms 
current destructive food patterns. How does that take place? In a chapter entitled “Life 
through death: Sacrificial eating” (pp. 110-143) Wirzba also draws on the concept of 
kenosis in order to place life and death in a Trinitarian perspective. The death of Jesus 
symbolises a life that gives itself completely for the sake of others. Biological death is 
therefore not an unqualified evil. Death is only evil if it becomes a force that degrades life 
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and despises the gift of nurture, not when it follows a fulfilled life (p. 115). Good death is 
the kenotic passage through which life moves (p. 111). Physiological death is therefore not 
merely the expiring of bodily organs and the obliterating of an autonomous self. Viewed 
Christologically, “death is a self-offering movement in which the individual gives himself 
or herself to another for the furtherance of another’s life… Rather than viewing life as a 
possession, the person inspired by Christ understands that life is a gift to be received and 
given again” (p. 112). In other words, by death (except in cases of cremation) one becomes 
food for other organisms on which one has been feeding. On this basis Wirzba can state 
that:  
Creation is an altar on which creatures are offered to each other as the expression of the 
Creator’s self-giving care and provision for life. To be made in the image of this Triune 
Creator is to be invited to share in the shaping of this world as an offering of love. The 
passage from death to genuine life is a loving movement of self-offering in which people 
lay down their lives for others in gestures of nurture and help (1 John 3:14-16) (p. 112). 
Death understood as the failed attempt to prevent the extinction of the ego implies a refusal 
to participate in the community of life. For Wirzba this is what sin entails: self-enclosure 
and self-glorification (p. 114). It is a way of being “that represents a fundamental violation 
of what it means to be a creature in relation with others altogether dependent upon God. To 
sin is to refuse to receive the world as gift. It is to reject love as the means through which 
the gifts of food and life are perpetually transformed into offerings that nurture creation and 
bring glory to God” (p. 114).  
In response, Wirzba retrieves a notion of sacrificial eating in order to help people 
understand that eating is a matter of life and death and to help turn Christian communities 
into more responsible, caring and grateful eaters (p. 116). Sacrifice is not a socially 
approved ritual to legitimise hunting and killing as a cathartic release of an aggressive 
instinct, but (for farmers) a form of self-sacrifice (giving up the best fruits that they have) in 
order to nurture a relationship with God (p. 119). It is best understood as an expression of 
gratitude before God. Wirzba explains: 
No matter how resourceful we are, we are not the sources of our own or any other life. 
How should we receive and become worthy of the countless lives that are given as a 
means for our sustenance and good? When we ponder this question we discover an 
overwhelming disproportion between the extent and cost of gifts received and the human 
ability to adequately express gratitude for them. We sense a fundamental inability to 
comprehend our own experience as maintained and continually intersected by the living 
and dying of countless others… To offer food to another, especially the precious and 
costly food of animal flesh, is to acknowledge that life is not to be taken for granted or 
hoarded as a possession to be used however one wills… To offer food to another 
expresses a profound insight into the gifted and interdependent character of the human 
condition. In this offering people acknowledge that as creatures they are beneficiaries of 
an incomprehensible and costly generosity and hospitality… To share food is 
fundamentally to share life (pp. 120-121). 
From such insights Wirzba seeks to develop a notion of Eucharistic sacrifice symbolised by 
the eating of bread and the drinking of wine. He captures the meaning of this meal for 
membership: “Eating, in other words, was the occasion in which Christ’s followers could 
witness to his ongoing presence in the world. To remember Jesus is to join in a re-
membering of a world dismembered by sin” (p. 150). Indeed, the whole of creation may be 
regarded as “an immense altar upon which the incomprehensible self-offering love of God 
is daily made manifest” (p. 126). This is symbolised by the seed that has to die in the 
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ground in order to bear fruit. This becomes the paradigm to understand the death and 
resurrection of Christ – which is also a pattern for Christian sacrificial living (p. 127). 
Wirzba thus concludes: 
The food we consume is God’s creation, a vast and unfathomably deep community of 
creatures that is sustained by God’s sacrificial love. Every time we eat, we are called to 
recognize the profound mystery that God created a world that, from the beginning (even 
in something like a pre-fallen state), lives through the eating of its members (p. 134). 
It should be clear that Wirzba, like McFague, employs the category of kenosis to come to 
terms with the consumption of food and becoming food for others. However, he does not 
treat kenosis as a cosmic moral principle since he links it much stronger to the sacrificial 
death of Jesus Christ and the resurrection of new life in Christ. This is necessary and 
possible given a sharper distinction between creation and fall. Life and death, eating and 
being eaten, killing other forms of life to eat and giving one’s own body to be eaten by 
others, form part and parcel of God’s good creation and should not be regarded as macabre 
or understood in a Manichean way. Feasting is the joy of life if appreciated with gratitude, 
hospitality and mercy and not gluttony, not taken for granted or exploited (p. 141). 
Sacrificial, Eucharistic eating is then a Christian response to the distortions associated with 
the production of food through commercialised agriculture and the consumption of food in 
a consumerist society (pp. 144-178). Eating bread and drinking wine involves relatively 
little violence – which encourages us towards a lifestyle that minimises violence although it 
cannot be completely avoided. It transforms eating in general so that it can become 
hospitable at its core and lead to a communion of life (p. 149). 
In a somewhat macabre sub-section Wirzba (while noting the criticism that early 
Christians were cannibals) speaks of ‘eating Jesus’. He explains that there is a physiological 
form of eating in which the other is absorbed into me to meet my nutritional needs so that I 
can live. However, ‘eating Jesus’ takes place in such a way that Jesus ‘abides’ in us (John 
15). In this case the other is not absorbed in me (signalling the end of a relationship) but 
remembered and hosted so that I “invite and welcome them to enter into my affective and 
moral imagination, and so I am transformed from within. With this kind of eating I am 
inspired, corrected and nourished by the other without the order being completely 
destroyed” (p. 157). ‘Eating Jesus’ results in the mutual indwelling that Paul describes as 
Christ dwelling in me. In a sense (drawing on Bernard of Clairvaux) we are also ‘eaten by 
Jesus’, even chewed and digested, breaking down what was eaten, so that we can be trans-
formed by Jesus from within and thus become the food that nurtures the world and so that 
we can celebrate and embrace the world as given by God (pp. 160-161). Wirzba links the 
process of eating (or being eaten by Jesus), chewing, absorbing nourishment and excreting 
what is harmful with the dialectic between cross and resurrection: “Resurrection life, the 
life that is true, abundant and eternal, goes through the crucifixion. When people are 
properly chewed by Christ, that is, when they are properly corrected, instructed and trained 
by Christ, this sin that divides and harms the body is destroyed so that each member can 
serve the other with a spirit of sympathy and gladness. With the destruction of sin we can 
become the nutritious food that will heal and strengthen the world” (p. 162). 
Wirzba clearly blends the physiological and metaphorical meaning of eating here, but 
given his own focus on appropriate forms of nourishment, one wonders whether such 
‘abiding’ would not lead to indigestion or constipation! He argues that “when people eat as 
those trained at the Eucharistic table, no life is simply fuel to be absorbed. All life becomes 
a sign and sacrament of God’s love, a witness to the costliness and mystery of life and 
death, and so becomes the inspiration to greater attention and care” (p. 158). However he 
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adds that “The opening through which another is welcomed into my mouth and life is also 
the opening through which my life is moved to respect and respond to what is other than 
me – starting with the humble word of thanks, but then extending to the implementation of 
food economies that care for life” (p. 158). This should lead to the virtues of gratitude and 
hospitality, but since the meaning of food as nourishment returns here, one has to ask 
whether such eating does not still involve killing the other, even if this is qualified by 
grateful remembrance.
24
 Are the evolutionary roots of violence overcome by saying that 
“whenever we eat, those we eat and those we eat with will have been welcomed and 
cherished as manifestations of God’s love” (p. 178)? 
This begs the question of how eating is understood eschatologically. Will there be 
eating in heaven? Will resurrected bodies eat? To his credit Wirzba addresses such question 
in the final chapter of his book. He is clearly still aware that eating vegetables and meat 
involves some form of ‘violence’ (killing other metabolisms), but also appreciates that 
eating is a symbol for hospitality and intimacy – in the gospel narratives and in agrarian 
communities alike. If the whole of creation manifests God’s primordial hospitality, then 
this has to apply also eschatologically. He therefore assumes that there will indeed be eating 
in ‘heaven’ and speculates that such eating will not necessarily imply consuming and 
destroying other forms of life – in the same way that the presence of God in the burning 
bush did not ‘consume’ the bush (Exodus 3:2). If eating implies intimacy, then it requires 
responsibility and affection for the other. So Wirzba concludes: “Eating is about accepting 
the reality of another – its life and death, its history of struggle and success, its dignity and 
grace – into our lives, into our mouths, into our bodies, and into our stories and hopes” (p. 
233). To enjoy a proleptic foretaste of heaven is to participate in a Eucharistic community 
where people live lives based on sacrificial self-offering, grateful reception and reconciled 
relationships (p. 234). 
 
An Inconclusive Postscript  
Is the violence associated with sin merely an extrapolation of the ‘violence’ embedded in 
the act of eating? All three the main authors selected for discussion in this essay would 
deny that this is the case. All three accept that death, eating and killing form part of parcel 
of the evolution of life on earth. Evil is then best understood as a radical distortion of the 
cycle of eating and being eaten. Sin is a contingent response to the conditions of creaturely 
finitude that has had disastrous consequences. This leaves one with the question of how to 
interpret such ‘violence’ (terminating other metabolisms) associated with most acts of 
eating (except perhaps for eating fruit, nuts and seeds).  
The three selected authors follow rather different strategies in this regard. Farley 
employs a notion of being a finite creature in order to recognise a ‘tragic’ dimension in 
human existence. That is not to be equated with evil so that the dialectic between sin and 
salvation is focused on the tension between idolatry and (in his terminology) ‘being 
founded’ (Farley 1990:139-153). McFague finds a kenotic principle at work in being eaten 
and suggests that this principle overrides the violence that may also be found. She regards 
this kenotic principle as core to the ethos promoted by the gospel. Being eaten therefore has 
salvific significance if that allows ecosystems to flourish. Wirzba also acknowledges the 
need for kenosis but understands that Christologically in terms of a conscious (and 
                                                 
24  One is reminded of an old joke here: In the African savannah a tourist is chased by a lion. Panicking, the 
tourist prays: “God, please grant that this would be a truly pious lion.” The prayer is answered. The pious lion 
kills the tourist and then prays: “For what we are about to receive, Lord, make us truly thankful.” 
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contingent) act of sacrifice in response to the ‘violence’ embedded in eating (which he 
recognises quite acutely). He imagines that such violence will be removed from eating 
eschatologically, even though this cannot be imagined protologically. 
Does any one of these strategies avoid either a Manichean or a Pelagian assessment of 
the human condition?
25
 Is there not something cooperative and something aggressive in all 
forms of eating? If so, are we to be saved from part of our own genetic heritage? Do we 
have to save ourselves (and the Earth) by minimising violence and enhancing a spirit of 
cooperation? What would this mean for human eating habits? The conclusion seems to be 
that an Augustinian approach is indeed less plausible and more counter-intuitive than 
Manichean or Pelagian assessments of where things have gone wrong in evolutionary 
history. If so, it seems that we cannot avoid fluctuating between Manichean pessimism (we 
have to eat and will be eaten) and Pelagian optimism (in eating and being eaten we can 
maintain the virtues of hospitality and reciprocity). 
If we indeed have to acknowledge a mixed evolutionary heritage that includes both a 
need for violence and a need for cooperation, then the contemporary food industry can 
claim some continuity with pre-human and early human evolution. It is indeed a 
collaborative enterprise on a gigantic scale that produces more food than ever before, 
although it comes at the price of skewed distribution amongst humans and considerable 
environmental costs. One may then seek to minimise the embedded structural violence, 
including unnecessary suffering for sentient animals, but the violence embedded in 
evolutionary history in the form of killing for food cannot be avoided. The danger here is 
that one may all to easily claim that the violence of industrialised capitalism is an extra-
polation of our evolutionary heritage. 
One may observe that such violence can indeed be minimised through appropriate 
human habits but that carnivores can scarcely be eliminated from evolutionary history. One 
may of course reserve the term ‘violence’ for actions with evil intention and then argue that 
eating by itself does not entail such violence. Eating does entail killing (absorbing other 
living organisms so that they no longer exist as discrete metabolisms), but that takes place 
in the interest of allowing life to flourish. Distinct metabolisms do exist but only within the 
context of larger ecosystems where absorbing another or becoming integrated in another is 
not a sign of death but of the flourishing of life within ecosystems. Either way, my attempt 
in this contribution is to test the distinction between natural suffering and socially-induced 
suffering without seeking escape routes from the ‘violence’ that is embedded in 
evolutionary history, ensuring that the test is made as hard as possible. One may rightly 
wish to emphasise the discontinuity between the violence associated with predation and 
inter-human violence, but the focus here was on assessing the significance of the continuity 
between biological evolution and cultural evolution. 
I need to add that I truly hope that such conclusions are wrong both on logical and on 
theological grounds. I therefore submit these inconclusive observations in the hope of being 
corrected by other scholars working in the field. 
 
                                                 
25  Robert Williams (1985:196) astutely observes on the eclipse of the Christian doctrine of sin and the 
contemporary interest in the problem of evil that “Modern culture presents a generally secular view of evil 
with optimistic and pessimistic variations. It is of particular theological interest that the types of views 
concerning evil against which classic Christian thought struggled – the optimistic Pelagian view and the 
pessimistic Manichean view – have tended to displace the Christian doctrine of sin.” 
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